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Matthew A. Ryen
Over the past few years, concert patrons have
found significantly less money in their pockets after
attending their favorite performances. An average
fan spends at least twenty dollars per ticket to attend
some of the lowest-priced concerts.1 Some big acts,
like Barbara Streisand and The Eagles, charge up to
$350 per ticket.' And if a fan wishes to bring some-
thing home to remember the experience, a souvenir
such as a shirt costs approximately twenty dollars.
In addition to these costs, fans must spend money on
food and transportation.
While it may be more expensive to buy a concert
ticket today, it is also more convenient than it was
ten years ago. Now, a person can simply pick up the
phone, call Ticketmaster (one of the largest compa-
nies in the United States who, for a fee, distributes
tickets over the phone to events at large venues
throughout the country), charge the ticket to a credit
card, and have the ticket mailed.' Telephone charg-
ing was not available ten years ago. If a person
1 "Tickets for most rock concerts range from around $22 to
$55, plus phone service charges that often add about $6 to $8."
Chuck Philips, Whaddaya Want for $20? A Ticket to Pearl
Jam?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994 (Calendar), at 59.
2 Id. Fans of the Eagles paid as much as $115 and Barbara
Streisand concert tickets cost up to $350 per ticket. Id.
' In the case of Ticketmaster, a customer can call a toll free
number, pay for tickets with a credit card, then receive the tick-
ets in the mail. Id. People are forced to buy tickets over the
phone since very few tickets are available at the venue a few
hours after the tickets are released. "Only about 100 tickets for
the rock package starring the Red Hot Chili Peppers and Pearl
Jam were still available at the amphitheater box office when it
opened at noon - three hours after the tickets went on sale at
Ticketmaster outlets throughout Southern California." Chuck
Philips, Breaking Down Those $4 to $7.75 Service Charges,
L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at F1.
See Chuck Philips, Pearl Jam, Ticketmaster and Now
Congress, L.A TIMES, June 30, 1994, at Fl.
' Memorandum of Pearl Jam to the Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice Concerning Anticompe-
titive Actions Engaged in by Ticketmaster Holdings Group Ltd.
(May 6, 1994)[hereinafter May Memorandum]; The Sherman
wanted to see a popular concert, he or she might
have tried camping out over night in a line of people
at the local record store to secure the opportunity to
buy a ticket.
On May 6, 1994, the rock band Pearl Jam ("the
Band"), one of the best selling bands in the country,"
filed a memorandum with the Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice ("D.O.J.")
arguing that Ticketmaster acted anticompetitively in
violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5 In
the complaining memorandum, the Band concluded
that Ticketmaster was a monopoly and illegally con-
trolled the price of tickets sold at most major ve-
nues.6 The D.O.J. investigated the allegations made
by the Band from approximately May 1994 to July
1995.' Before concluding that there was no antitrust
violation, the D.O.J. conducted numerous interviews
with members of the music and entertainment indus-
tries.' The central focus of the D.O.J. investigation
was "Ticketmaster's practice of paying a portion of
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994); Richard C. Reuben,
Ticketmaster in a Jam: Rock Group, Lawsuits Claim Antitrust
Violations, 80 A.B.A. J. 17 (1994).
0 The band argued that
freedom of choice - a basic principal of competition in this
country - does not effectively exist in the music industry
today. Something is vastly wrong with a structure under
which a ticket distribution service can dictate the markup
on the price of a concert ticket, can prevent a band from
using other, less expensive, methods of tickets [sic], and
can effectively preclude a band from performing at a par-
ticular arena if it does not accede to using Ticketmaster.
Pearl Jam's Antitrust Complaint: Questions About Concert,
Sports, and Theater Ticket Handling Charges and Other Prac-
tices, Hearing Before the Information, Justice, Transportation,
and Agriculture Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Oper-
ations House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1994)[hereinafter Hearing](statement of Pearl Jam); see also
May Memorandum, supra note 5.
7 Chuck Philips, Rock Group Files Complaint Over Alleged
Tactics of Ticketmaster, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1994, at A38.
S Chuck Philips, Ticketmaster Cleared, WASH. POST, July
6, 1995, at C2. Talent managers, promoters, venue owners, and
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
the service fees it collects to the owners of major ve-
nues and promotion firms in exchange for exclusive
contracts to ticket all events at those venues." 9 By
ultimately dropping the antitrust investigation, the
D.O.J. may have placed a stamp of approval on the
controversial contracts that Ticketmaster employs.
One message is clear, consumers who think concert
tickets are too expensive will not gain assistance
from the D.O.J.
This comment evaluates the D.O.J.'s decision to
drop Pearl Jam's antitrust complaint against Tick-
etmaster and, in particular, how the D.O.J. defined
Ticketmaster's relevant market, a key component
needed to determine Ticketmaster's market share in
the context of a claim of monopolization under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 Part I sum-
marizes the events involved in the dispute between
Pearl Jam and Ticketmaster. Part II lays out a
framework of the issues considered in a claim of mo-
nopolization under Section 2. Part III examines
Pearl Jam's claim that Ticketmaster monopolized
the distribution of tickets to most major concert and
entertainment events in the United States. Part IV
analyzes Ticketmaster's relevant product and geo-
graphic markets as they might be used to evaluate
Ticketmaster's alleged monopolistic position in the
market. Part V concludes that the relevant market
that should be used to evaluate Ticketmaster's al-
leged monopolistic stance includes the distribution of
tickets to rock concerts at "large" or "main line" ve-
nues in heavily populated metropolitan areas.
ticket software firms were among those reportedly interviewed.
Id.
, Id.
10 Pearl Jam also argues that Ticketmaster violates § 1 of
the Sherman Act. May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 5. Anal-
ysis of the § I claim is outside the scope of this comment.
" May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1. Ticketmaster is
no stranger to lawsuits and criticism concerning its market share
and service fees. Chuck Philips, Nix Ticket-Fee Settlement,
Consumer Group Urges, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1994, at F2. In
April 1994, a week after Pearl Jam's initial request to Tick-
etmaster for a cap on service charges at its concerts, Consumer
Action, a California consumer rights group, urged members of a
class action suit to reject a settlement with Ticketmaster since
the ticket company would not acknowledge fault. Id. The con-
sumer action group contended that the settlement "[did] nothing
to lower convenience fees or to address the issue of competition
in the ticket service market." Id.
"' May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1; "Pearl Jam does
not seek any portion of the service charges imposed by Tick-
etmaster." Id. at 3.
18 Supplemental Memorandum of Pearl Jam to the Anti-
trust Division of the United States Department of Justice Re-
sponding to Various Assertions Made by Ticketmaster Corpora-
tion 7 (July 20, 1994).
I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO PEARL JAM'S
COMPLAINT
On May 6, 1994, Pearl Jam submitted a memo-
randum to the D.O.J. urging the "Antitrust Division
[to] investigate recent anticompetitive actions by
Ticketmaster directed against Pearl Jam in violation
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." 11 In its
brief, the Band stated that their efforts to cap service
fees grew out of concern for their fans' ability to pay
the large ticket prices, now standard in the indus-
try.12 In addition to the price of a ticket, service
charges levied by Ticketmaster range from $1.50 for
a movie ticket" to $15 for a concert." Pearl Jam
asserted that Ticketmaster typically charges any-
where from four to six dollars in service fees for
their concerts."8
After their summer tour in 1993, Pearl Jam re-
quested that Ticketmaster list its service fee sepa-
rately on the ticket so customers would know how
much the Band was actually charging. 6 Frustrated
and ultimately unable to influence Ticketmaster's
practice, Pearl Jam tried to distribute tickets on their
own through a lottery.17 That plan did not work.
The promoter involved in the lottery scheme to dis-
tribute tickets was subsequently threatened "with a
lawsuit for breaching its exclusive dealing agreement
with Ticketmaster by allowing Pearl Jam to dis-
tribute tickets to the concert other than through
Ticketmaster."' 8 After some discussion with Pearl
" In the News, FED. NEWS SERVICE, July 1, 1994. "As an-
yone who has read the papers this summer is undoubtedly
aware, the Ticketmaster service charge has in at least one case
been reported to have gone as high as $15 per ticket." Id.
16 May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
Sources estimate that about $2 of the $4 convenience fee
pays for operating expenses such as rent, payroll, facility
phone lines, credit card fees, programming and mainte-
nance of computers. Another $1 of the $4 fee is paid to
Music Plus, May Co. and other stores for acting as Tick-
etmaster outlets. There are 180 outlets in Southern Cali-
fornia. At least 15% (or 60 cents) of the $4 convenience
fee is paid to venue owners to subsidize long-term, six-
figure contracts with each facility guaranteeing Tick-
etmaster exclusive ticket distribution rights to the
building.
Philips, supra note 3.
16 May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
17 Id. "Persons interested in purchasing tickets to the concert
were asked to send in written requests, and the social security
numbers of lottery winners were printed in Detroit newspapers
along with instructions about where and when to pick up tick-
ets." Id.
"8 Id. The following excerpt from a memorandum dated
March 25, 1994, from the North American Concert Promoters
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Jam and its agents, 9 the ticket company agreed to
limit their service charge to $1.80 per ticket, but only
for Pearl Jam's Boston show.
20
In preparation for a later concert in New York's
Madison Square Garden ("MSG"), the Band en-
ticed eleven radio stations to give away the right to
buy tickets for eighteen dollars, thus avoiding Tick-
etmaster's services and charges." In response, Tick-
etmaster allegedly threatened to sue Paramount
Communications, the owners of MSG, because of an
exclusive distribution agreement between MSG and
Ticketmaster. 22 The use of creative ticket distribu-
tion mechanisms coupled with Pearl Jam's efforts to
undermine Ticketmaster's exclusive contract agree-
ments prompted Ticketmaster to warn Pearl Jam to
"'watch their backs.' "23 Later, Ticketmaster
threatened to sue Pearl Jam in tort for interfering
with its exclusive dealing agreements with venues
and promoters.2
A. Pearl Jam's Memorandum
In May 1994, Pearl Jam filed a memorandum
soliciting the D.O.J. to investigate Ticketmaster.
Association to the Association's membership, illustrates Tick-
etmaster's influence over promoters and venues:
This is an update on the Pearl Jam/Ticketmaster contro-
versy. Fred has indicated that he intends to take a very
strong stand on this issue to protect Ticketmaster's ex-
isting contracts with promoters and facilities and, further,
TM will use all available remedies to protect itself from
outside third parties that attempt to interfere with those
existing contracts. TM views the Pearl Jam issue as an
all or nothing proposition, meaning they will not agree to
handle half of the available inventory on a show in any
situation where a contract exists. If asked, you may wish
to consider and cite this fact: you and/or your venue have
an existing contract with TM which precludes you from
contracting with others to distribute tickets. I urge you to
be very careful about entering into a conflicting agreement
which could expose you to a lawsuit. I know all of you
hope this matter is resolved amicably to everyone's satis-
faction. In the interim, you may want to review your situ-
ation in preparation for an important decision that you
may be asked to make next week.
Hearing, supra note 6, at 26 (Letter from Ben Liss, Executive
Director, North American Concert Promoters Association, to
Membership of the Association (Mar. 25, 1994)).
19 Id.
2" May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 4. Ticketmaster
eventually acquiesced, but the company was adamant that it
would not limit service charges again. Id. Ticketmaster agreed to
sell tickets only over the phone in an effort to block scalpers
from buying large blocks of tickets at Ticketmaster outlets and
then selling them at inflated prices. Id.
"' Id. "Pearl Jam in New York opted to have eleven radio
stations give away rights to purchase two tickets for $18.00
Pearl Jam complained that Ticketmaster "dominated
the ticket market since 1991 "25 and that today it is
"virtually impossible for a band to do a tour of large
arenas or other significant venues in major cities and
not deal with Ticketmaster." ' The Band pointed to
the "Exclusive Rights" section of one promoter's
contract which gave Ticketmaster the sole right to
distribute tickets for any concert produced by the
contracting party2" and hypothesized that most of
Ticketmaster's contracts included the "Exclusive
Rights" clause to ensure market security for
Ticketmaster."8
B. Congressional Attention
On June 30, 1994, Pearl Jam and Ticketmaster
representatives were invited to testify before the
House Information, Justice, Transportation, and
Agriculture Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations. 9 Pearl Jam's Stone
Gossard8 ° and Jeff Ament8" argued that Tick-
etmaster was unlawfully interfering with their free-
dom to determine the price and terms of ticket sales
apiece to fans calling in during the forty-eight hours preceding
the concert. The tickets could be picked up in advance at the




25 Chuck Philips, Ticketmaster Documents Sought in Probe,
L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at D2. In 1991, the D.O.J. allowed
Ticketmaster to buy certain assets from Ticketron, "which at the
time was its only major competitor." Id.
26 Testimony June 30, 1994 Pearl Jam House Government
Opera ions/Information, Justice, Transportation and Agricul-
ture Ticket Distribution Industry, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING-
HOUSE, June 30, 1994, at 38 [hereinafter Testimony]. "Tick-
etmaster ... has a virtual monopoly on the distribution of tickets
to concerts in this country." Id. at 1.
27 May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2; Pearl Jam ex-
plained that it was difficult to obtain a portion of the contract
due to Ticketmaster's strength in the industry, Id.
28 See id. The "Exclusive Rights" section:
Principal hereby grants to Ticketmaster and Ticketmaster
accepts from Principal the exclusive right during the term
of this agreement to sell as Principal's agent at outlets
and/or by telephone sales all tickets made available to the
public for any attraction scheduled or presented by the
Principal at the facility and sold at the facility box office.
Id. (quoting an "Exclusive Rights" section from a contract be-
tween Ticketmaster and a promoter).
29 See Testimony, supra note 26.
o Stone Gossard is Pearl Jam's lead guitarist. Philips, supra
note 4.




to their concerts.3 2 Ticketmaster responded by assert-
ing that the memorandum submitted to the D.O.J.
was a "work of fiction.""3
Gossard and Ament's testimony in June caught at
least one representative's attention.3' On August 19,
1994, Representative John D. Dingell (D-Mich.)
submitted a bill "requiring ticket distributors to dis-
close the fees they add to the price of each ticket."3"
The bill, if passed, would be the first federal law
regulating ticket distribution. 6
C. ETM and the End of the D.O.J. Investigation
On April 4, 1995, the Band announced a thirteen
date tour and its decision to use a new ticketing com-
pany, ETM.37 ETM, much like Ticketmaster, is
able to process numerous ticket orders over the
phone in a short period of time. 8 However, ETM
has proven to be more flexible in determining the
service charge. The company agreed to add only a
two dollar service fee and a forty five cent handling
charge for Pearl Jam's tickets.39
On July 5, 1995, the D.O.J., in a two sentence
statement, announced the end of its year long Tick-
etmaster investigation as well as its decision to not
take any formal action.4" The D.O.J.'s Antitrust Di-
vision said that it would "continue to monitor com-
petitive developments in the ticketing industry."' 1
While one newspaper hypothesized that the investi-
gation centered on Ticketmaster's practice of paying
a portion of its fees to promoters and venue owners
32 Testimony, supra note 26. Pearl Jam received support
from other musicians including Garth Brooks, Neil Young,
R.E.M, the Grateful Dead, and Aerosmith. Philips, supra note
4.
" Testimony, supra note 26, at 21. Ticketmaster stated that
"[t]he heart of the campaign is a memorandum written by Pearl
Jam's lawyers .. .which is - to put it charitably - a work of
fiction." Id. The Memorandum was prepared by the prominent
law firm Sullivan and Cromwell. Id.
34 Id.
" Chuck Philips, Bill Would Require Ticket Fee Disclo-
sures, L.A. TimEs, Aug. 12, 1994, at D4.
" Chuck Philips, House to Weigh Ticket Vendor Law, L.A.
TIME S, Aug. 19, 1994, at D4.
" Eric Boehlert, Play-By-Play Account of Pearl Jam Saga,
BILLBOARD, July 8, 1995, at 85.
S" Eric Boehlert, Ticketmaster Rivals Seek New Biz, BILL-
BOARD, July 22, 1995, at 1. ETM sets itself apart by custom-
izing each ticket with the purchasers name and a bar code.
These identification markings are used to prevent unauthorized
resale of tickets, or what is referred to as scalping. Id. at 79.
39 Id.
40 Philips, supra note 8.
41 Division Drops Investigation of Practices By Tick-
etmaster, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., (BNA) No.1721, at
in exchange for exclusive contracts,'2 Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno explained 43 that "[her] understand-
ing is that the Division dropped its probe at this
point because 'new enterprises' are entering the
market."
44
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR MONOPOLIZA-
TION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHER-
MAN ACT
In its memorandum to the D.O.J., Pearl Jam ar-
gued that "because Ticketmaster is dominant in the
distribution of tickets to concerts, its rigid enforce-
ment of exclusive dealing agreements with virtually
every promoter and venue in the United States is a
blatant exercise of monopoly power in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.'
45
The D.O.J. apparently considered the charge in
light of Section 2 of the Sherman Act which states
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ... ."4 Section 2 was passed in reaction to
the fear of the rapid growth of individual and corpo-
rate wealth from trade and industry.' Since it is
couched in broad terms, it has been adaptable to the
changes in commercial production and distribution
that have evolved since its passage.'"
To prove monopolization in violation of Section 2,
32 (July 13, 1995)[hereinafter Division Drops Investigation].
42 Philips, supra note 8.
48 Division Drops Investigation, supra note 41.
44 Id.
4' See May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 7.
46 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
' Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50
(1911).
[T]he main cause which led to the legislation was the
thought that it was required by the economic condition of
the times, that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the
hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous de-
velopment of corporate organization, the facility for com-
bination which such organizations afforded, the fact that
the facility was being used, and that combinations known
as trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread im-
pression that their power had been and would be exerted
to repress individuals and injure the public generally.
Id.
48 United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 386 (1956). "Section 2 does not define the elements of
the offense of attempted monopolization. Nor is there much
guidance to be had in the scant legislative history of that provi-
sion, which was added late in the legislative process." Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 889 (1993).
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the complainant must show that the firm possesses
monopoly power in a relevant market and that it
willfully holds that power.49 To measure a firm's
monopoly power, or market power, the firm's market
share must be calculated.5" To calculate market
share in a relevant market, the market can be de-
fined through an evaluation of the relevant product
and geographic markets.5 Once a firm is shown to
have what a court will consider to be sufficient mar-
ket power, then it must find that the firm willfully
acquired or attained its power. 2
"Monopoly power is the power to control prices
or exclude competition."" It has also been described
as "a high degree of market power." '54 When deter-
mining whether the firm in question has enough
market power to be guilty of illegal monopolization,
a court will generally hold that a ninety percent
market share is enough to support the necessary in-
ference of market power." However, in some in-
stances courts have found a market share of approxi-
mately seventy-five percent to be sufficient.5 At least
one court has determined that market share is not
the sole factor used to determine monopoly power.57
Other factors considered might include: a decline in
market share over time, testimony that the market
was very competitive, a dominant firm's decision to
lower its price in an effort to hold its market share, a
substantial number of competitors entering the mar-
ket, and high technology and product research
costs.58
49 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966).
50 See generally HERBERT HOVENCAMP, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
§ 6.2 (1994).
51 KENNETH M. PARZYCH, A PRIMER TO ANTITRUST LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY 43 (1987).
5 384 U.S. at 570-71. The Court notes that willful acquisi-
tion is not the same as the growth or development associated
with a better product or smarter business planning. Id.
03 United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
5 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981).
05 HOVENCAMP, supra note 50 at 244.
56 Id; see also Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (stating that 87% is
sufficient); United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948) (stating that 70% is sufficient).
07 CARLA A. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 1.20, at 30 (3rd
ed. 1985).
08 Id. Hills refers to some factors laid out in a Federal Dis-
trict Court decision from 1980. Id.
59 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK
§ 20311], at 344 (1994 ed.).
60 Id.
One antitrust scholar suggests that two factors
should be used to determine a relevant product mar-
ket.59 The first factor is the extent to which a prod-
uct is "interchangeable in use" with alternatives, and
the second is the degree of "cross-elasticity of de-
mand" between the product at issue and close substi-
tutes to it. 60 Interchangeable products are identified
by the willingness of consumers to substitute a par-
ticular product for the product in question.6 If pur-
chasers are willing to use one product instead of an-
other, then those products are probably in the same
product market.62 Testing for cross-elasticity evalu-
ates the change in demand for one product when the
price of another is altered." When the products are
substitutes, the increase in the price of one will re-
sult in a rise in the demand for the other.64 Products
which react in this way are considered part of the
same product market.6"
The geographic market is the area of effective
competition where the defendant operates, and
where purchasers can purchase substitute products
or services.66 In determining the geographic market,
a number of questions can be asked. Do the firms
competing in the industry perceive it as separate and
distinct?67 Do firms from outside the region make
sales within it?68 Are prices responsive to economic
activity from outside the region?69 Do transportation
costs or lack of storage and distribution facilities
block firms outside the region from competing? 0
With reference to seller and buyer conduct - who are
6' See generally United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956)(determining the relevant mar-
ket depends upon differences between products and at what
point buyers will substitute one product for another).
62 HOLMES, supra note 59, at 344.
62 See generally Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400. "An element for
consideration as to cross-elasticity of demand between products is
the responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of
the other." Id. The Court concluded that cellophane is inter-
changeable with other flexible packaging material and, therefore,
included as a part of the flexible packaging material market. Id.
64 Id. "If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a
considerable number of customers of other flexible wrappings to
switch to cellophane, it would be an indication that a high cross-
elasticity of demand exists between them; that the products com-
pete in the same market." Id.
65 Id.
60 HILLS, supra note 57, at 34; see also Tampa Electric Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949).
67 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF






the actual competitive forces ?71
Generally, intent is not an essential element of
monopolization.72 However, a monopoly will not be
found where firms find themselves in possession of
monopoly power without having intended to quash
competition.7 ' To prove an attempted monopoly, in-
tent may be required."" On the other hand, "[w]illful
acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power" is
required when showing an offense of monopoly
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.7 5 Testing
whether or not conduct by a dominant party is will-
ful should be based on "considerations of fairness
and the need to preserve proper economic incentives.
7. 6 A party who finds itself innocently possessing
monopoly power may be in violation of Section 2 by
"'maintaining or extending market control .... "77
III. PEARL JAM'S ARGUMENT THAT
TICKETMASTER HOLDS MONOPOLY
POWER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2
Pearl Jam argued that after Ticketmaster pur-
chased Ticketron in 1991, it became "far and away
the country's largest . . . distributor" of tickets to
most major concerts and entertainment events in the
United States.7 8 The Band further argued that Tick-
etmaster's exclusive dealing agreements left major
venues with no alternative means of distributing
tickets.7 9
The Band relied upon the Supreme Court's find-
ing in Luria Bros. & Co. v. F.T.C.,80 that certain
agreements, although not on their face absolutely re-
strictive of competition, may in effect violate Section
71 Id.
72 HOVENCAMP, supra note 50, at 249 (explaining that most
courts require only evidence of exclusionary practice by a firm
with monopoly power).
78 See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 429-30 (noting one instance where a monopoly may
exist because of circumstances surrounding the industry rather
than planning or desire on the part of a firm).
71 HOVENCAMP, supra note 50, at 249.
75 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966).
78 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
274 (2d Cir. 1979)(explaining that the considerations of fairness
block the application of § 2 where a firm is merely competing),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1979).
77 Id. (explaining the rule in Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563).
78 Reuben, supra note 5.
"' May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 5-7. In effect Tick-
etmaster controls who and under what terms a venue may sched-
ule a show. Id.
80 389 F.2d 847 (3rd. Cir. 1966).
8, Id. at 860. "Although, it is true that these agreements
2.81 This concept of de facto restraint on competition
parallels the facts of this case because of the ambigu-
ous nature of Ticketmaster's control over the large
concert venue.82 Although Pearl Jam and other
bands"3 have taken steps to circumvent Ticketmaster
and still compete in the national music arena, the
Band claimed it had to cancel its summer tour on
account of their disagreement with Ticketmaster.8 '
Pearl Jam also argued that' both Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States?5 and Advanced Health-Care
Serv. v. Radford Community Hosp.8 are applicable
to their complaint. In Lorain, the Court found that a
publisher engaged in an attempt to monopolize by
placing certain restrictions on the advertising space
in its newspaper.87 Although the advertisers had a
choice to use an alternative radio station, most
"could not afford to discontinue their newspaper ad-
vertising in order to use the radio" because of the
newspaper's large market share.8 The same is true
in the Pearl Jam - Ticketmaster controversy because
of Ticketmaster's dominance in the ticket distribu-
tion market.
In Advanced Health-Care, the Fourth Circuit
held that, "if a plaintiff shows that a defendant has
harmed consumers and competition by making a
short-term sacrifice in order to further its exclusive,
anti-competitive objectives, it has shown predation
by that defendant."89 Pearl Jam argued that Tick-
etmaster acted like a predator when it reduced its
profits in the short term in order to limit the growth
of alternative ticket distribution services. 90 Their
memorandum referred to a memo written by the ex-
ecutive director of the North American Concert Pro-
were formally terminated within a short time, the Commission
was justified in finding that in fact the relationship remained
unchanged." Id. The court in Luria found that the agreements
were restrictive of competition. Id.
82 This ambiguity runs from the fact that Pearl Jam is seek-
ing alternative venues. Bruce Haring, Pop Eye, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1994 (Calendar), at 64.
88 "Representatives of [Neil] Young and Pearl Jam confirm
that tentative plans are being made for shows to be held in fields
and other alternative venues with low ticket prices - a nod to
Pearl Jam's well-publicized battle with Ticketmaster." Id.
84 May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 6.
88 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
" 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
87 The publisher did not allow advertisements from firms
who also advertised on the competing radio station in the local-
ity. Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 152.
88 Id. at 153. The newspaper was seen as the most effective
advertising medium because of the large percentage of the popu-
lation who read it. Id.
89 Advanced Health-Care, 910 F.2d at 148.
90 See May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 12.
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moters Association to the association's members 1 in
which it states that "[Ticketmaster] views the Pearl
Jam issue as an all or nothing proposition, meaning
they will not agree to handle half of the available
inventory on a show in any situation where a con-
tract exists."'" This memo reveals Ticketmaster's de-
cision to forego revenue in order to protect its market
share. Because of Ticketmaster's anticompetitive be-
havior, Pearl Jam could not choose to play at large
venues with alternative ticket distributors; thus, be-
cause of Ticketmaster, the Band automatically limits
its exposure and ability to compete in the national
music market.
The Band concluded its memorandum by urging
the D.O.J.'s Antitrust Division to launch an investi-
gation of Ticketmaster's anti-competitive actions and
its "monopolistic enforcement of exclusive dealing
agreements with promoters and venues for
concerts."'"
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF TICKETMASTER'S
RELEVANT MARKET
Pearl Jam and its attorneys failed to adequately
address the factors surrounding Ticketmaster's rele-
vant market in their effort to lay out a clear case of
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. The memorandum does not define the rele-
vant product or geographic market. Pearl Jam's
facts, as applied to the law pertaining to delineation
of the relevant market in an alleged monopolization,
lead to the conclusion that a small market should be
defined to include only ticket distribution to concerts
at "main line" venues at major cities in the United
States.
A. Ticketmaster's Product Market
An evaluation of the relevant product market is
91 Id. at 6.
91 Id. at 16.
93 Id. at 13.
" See United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966)(stating that a monopoly under § 2 must have monopoly
power in the relevant market); HOLMES, supra note 59, at 344
(holding that a relevant market includes a product and a geo-
graphic market).
9' Letter from Matthew Walker, Senior Research Analyst,
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union,
to Jonathan Rich, U.S. Department of Justice (Mar. 21,
1991)[hereinafter Union Letter](on file with the D.O.J.). The
letter was in response to the D.O.J. investigation of Tick-
etmaster's proposed acquisition of significant assets of Ticketron.
Id. Ticketron was founded in 1968 and became the dominant
essential to analyzing Ticketmaster's market share
and proving monopoly status.'4 On one hand, all
tickets sold might be considered the relevant product
market in which Ticketmaster participates." On the
other hand, there are a number of persuasive factors
which indicate that the relevant market to be consid-
ered is a very small one, including only tickets to
major or "main line" venues for rock concerts. A
larger product market (e.g., all tickets sold to en-
tertainment events in the United States) makes it
more difficult to show that Ticketmaster controls the
requisite percentage of market share needed to vio-
late Section 2. 9" In contrast, a small market, includ-
ing only those tickets to music performances at ve-
nues seating over 50,000 people, makes it easier to
show that Ticketmaster's market share is large
enough to violate Section 2.
9
7
B. The Industry Defines the Market
Pearl Jam could have relied on the 1959 Supreme
Court case, International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc.
v. United States.' In International Boxing, the
Court upheld the lower court's holding that the pro-
motion of championship boxing contests rather than
all boxing events constituted the relevant market for
evaluation of the industry under the antitrust laws.99
The Court supported its delineation by pointing to
detailed findings in the record which showed that
championship fights or bouts brought in over three
times the revenue of non-championship bouts; televi-
sion rights for championship fights brought more
than two times the revenue compared with non-
championship contests; several million more televi-
sion viewers watched championship bouts according
to Nielsen ratings; and no movie rights were sold for
non-championship bouts, whereas movie rights for
championship bouts were shown to be quite lucra-
tive.100 The rationale is linked to the way the indus-
force in the ticketing industry. The firm began its down turn in
the 1980's. Id. The letter predicts that the merging parties will
want to include all tickets in the relevant market, including cin-
ema, and minor league baseball. Id.
90 See generally HOVENCAMP, supra note 50, at 83-84 (not-
ing, for example, that a market for automobiles is much larger
than the market for Ford automobiles).
" See International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United
States, 358 U.S. 242, 251 (1959)(upholding the lower court's
finding that production of non-championship boxing fights are
not reasonably interchangeable with championship contests).
98 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
99 Id. at 251.
100 Id. at 250-51.
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try and the Boxing Club chose to define itself
through its coordinated operation.
The relevant market for Ticketmaster can be ana-
lyzed in a similar way. Consider a letter written by
the Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees In-
ternational Union ("Union") in response to the 1991
D.O.J. evaluation of Ticketmaster's proposed acqui-
sition of Ticketron.' 0 ' The Union's letter included
an exhibit entitled "Contract Status of Major Ve-
nues - 1990. By State, City and Seating Capac-
ity."' ' The list helped to define the relevant product
market by including facilities that the Union, an ac-
tor in the industry, believed were relevant to Tick-
etmaster's business.' 0 3 The list included facilities
that seat between approximately 400 to 95,000 peo-
ple.'0 A pie graph attached to the list indicated that
in 1990 Ticketmaster held exclusive contracts for
sixty-eight percent of the total number of seats in ve-
nues that seat over 50,000 people.' 5
At that time, the letter reported that Ticketron
held twenty-one percent of the seating in similar ve-
nues where exclusive contracts existed.' Shortly af-
ter the letter was written, Ticketmaster bought Tick-
etron. 0 7 In addition, some news writers assert that
Ticketmaster currently has exclusive contracts with
two thirds of the major venues in this country.' 0 8
Ticketmaster submitted a list of "well known or
larger venues" in the top fifty most highly populated
cities in the country at the request of the Informa-
tion, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture, Sub-
committee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions House of Representatives ("House
Subcommittee").' 9 Although Ticketmaster stated
that the list is not exhaustive," 0 it is coincidental
that the company chose only to include well known
venues in large metropolitan areas. For instance, the
list includes eleven stadiums and halls such as Shea
Stadium, Yankee Stadium, Carnegie Hall and Lin-






107 See, e.g., Boehlert, supra note 38.
108 Ralph Blumenthal, Oddities Continue With Tick-
etmaster and Pearl Jam, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, at Cl1
(estimating that Ticketmaster has exclusive contracts with two
thirds of the nation's largest arenas); Linda Himmelstein, Will
Ticketmaster Get Scalped?, Bus. WK., June 26, 1995, at 64.
109 Hearing, supra note 6, at 128-34.
110 Id. at 128.
III Id.
112 Id.
coin Center in New York City."' Smaller venues
such as the Beacon Theater and Radio City Music
Hall are not mentioned." 2 This implies that Tick-
etmaster considers these larger, well known locations
to be a part of a separate and distinct market, rele-
vant to the issues raised by Pearl Jam. Reflecting on
the data provided in the letter, the reports in the
news, and Ticketmaster's own list, it appears that
even Ticketmaster defines a relevant market by in-
cluding large venues in heavily populated metropoli-
tan areas.
C. Cross-elasticity
The Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours and Co."' called for "an ap-
praisal of the 'cross-elasticity' of demand" when
identifying the relevant product market." 4 As stated
in Part II of this Comment, the cross-elasticity of de-
mand measures the extent to which the change in
price of one product will alter the demand for an-
other." 5 Two factors should be considered: the ex-
tent to which a product is interchangeable in use
with alternatives; and the degree of cross-elasticity of
demand between the product at issue and close sub-
stitutes to it." 6
In the case of Ticketmaster, there are few substi-
tutes to use in calculating the cross-elasticity. "' In
July, 1995, Billboard magazine named four "chal-
lengers" to Ticketmaster: Dillard's, Tele-charge,
ProTix, Select-A-Seat, and ETM." 8 The article re-
ported that these companies offer essentially the
same services as Ticketmaster." 9 However, the com-
panies mentioned in the article control very small
markets scattered throughout the United States. 2
Pearl Jam, and at least one other band, have at-
tempted to distribute tickets through "alternative
351 U.S. 377 (1956).
"1 Id. at 394.
11I Id. at 400.
11e HOLMES, supra note 59, at 344.
"I See generally Boehlert, supra note 38.
118 Id.
Id.
120 Id. Dillards does most of its business in the southwest.
Id. at 78. Tele-charge has money to help market itself nation-
wide, but insiders in the industry expect it to 'pick its spots,'
rather than take on Ticketmaster nationally. Id. Protix, out of
Wisconsin, has a few large contracts scattered throughout the
United States. It recently won a contract to provide ticketing for
the summer Olympics in Atlanta. Id. Select-A-Seat concentrates
its efforts in North and South Carolina. Id. at 79. ETM, Pearl
Jam's ticketor of choice, has national aspirations. Id.
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means."' However, real substitutes for Tick-
etmaster appear to be few and far between.' 2 If this
market were competitive, when the concept of cross-
elasticity of demand is applied, the substitute firms
would see a rise in demand for their tickets when
Ticketmaster increased its price.12 8 In a market
where a monopoly exists, the demand for tickets sold
by substitutes to Ticketmaster would stay essentially
unchanged when Ticketmaster increased its price.' 2 '
Here, the reported substitute firms could be excluded
from the relevant market if it can be shown that
Ticketmaster has been able to increase its price
while demand for tickets sold by other firms re-
mained constant.
Once again, the 1991 Union letter to the D.O.J.
raises several interesting points.'2 5 At that time, the
relevant market needed was identified in the context
of a merger.'" 6 However, the method used to deline-
ate the market does not change in a monopoly analy-
sis. ' 7 The Union also contended that a ticket to a
rock concert should constitute a separate product
from a ticket to a movie or a sporting event since a
music fan would not chose to buy a movie ticket just
because the price of concert tickets increased.' Fi-
nally, the Union suggested that the exclusive nature
of the agreements in the industry function as a bar-
rier to firms who would like to enter the ticketing
market.' 2 9
D. Ticketmaster's Geographic Market
One statement used by the Supreme Court to de-
scribe the geographic market is that the market cho-
sen must " 'correspond to the commercial realities' of
the industry."' 8 0 In the case of Ticketmaster and the
ticket distribution industry, there are some cities
.. See generally Eric Boehlert, STP Eye Tix System, BILL-
BOARD, Mar. 4, 1995, at 1 (explaining a move by the rock
group, Stone Temple Pilots, to create and implement its own
ticketing system); see also Hearing, supra note 6, at 17-18 (re-
counts Pearl Jam's attempts at distributing tickets themselves in
both Detroit and New York City).
12 Boehlert, supra note 38.
128 See generally HOLMES, supra note 59, at 345-46 (ex-
plaining the application of cross-elasticity of demand).
124 Id.
... Union Letter, supra note 95.
126 Id.
127 See generally HOVENCAMP, supra note 50, at 83 (sug-
gesting that both merger and monopoly analyses use the same
approach to determine the relevant antitrust market).
"'I See Union Letter, supra note 95.
129 Id.
13 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37
where a venue or a producer has more than one
choice for ticketing services.' There are some com-
panies, aside from Ticketmaster, who participate in
the industry on a regional level. " 2 There are even a
few companies who might be able to offer services in
a national market."' In accordance with "commer-
cial realities," there are different choices depending
on the location in question.' 3 However, Tick-
etmaster appears to function in a national market
even though it has little competition in some
regions. "'
E. Applying the Grinnell Rational
The Supreme Court in United States v. Grin-
nelp" held that Grinnell's market was national even
though its services were local in scope.' 7 The Court
found that Grinnell had a national business plan,
dealt with national companies, and made agreements
involving activities in many States. "' Ticketmaster
could be viewed in the same light. While it may pro-
vide services that are consumed in one definable lo-
cation, Ticketmaster markets itself and pursues busi-
ness opportunities in major cities all over the
country.' "
Part II of this comment identified some questions
that could be asked to determine the relevant geo-
graphic market. The first question asked whether or
not the firms who compete perceive their specific
market as separate and distinct."0 Here, it is clear
that Ticketmaster views its market nationally. The
list of venues, as submitted to the House Subcommit-
tee, lists arenas and halls all around the country."'
Another question that appears relevant is whether
transportation costs or the lack of storage and distri-
bution facilities block firms outside a particular re-
(1962)(citation omitted)(suggesting that Congress intended a fac-
tual rather than legalistic approach to defining the relevant mar-
ket); see also HOLMES, supra note 59, at 351-52.
131 See generally Boehlert supra note 38, at 1.
132 Id.
133 Id. (suggesting that ETM and Tele-charge in particular
could have the ability to compete with Ticketmaster in the
future).
is' In Utah there is just one ticket company to do business
with. Hearing, supra note 6, at 37.
1I See generally Himmelstein, supra note 108, at 65.
136 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
137 Id. at 575.
18 Id.
8 See generally Himmelstein, supra note 108, at 65.
140 SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 68.
14 Hearing, supra note 6, at 128-34.
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gion from entering the market." 2 The use of com-
puters and communication technology in ticket
distribution makes it adaptable to many locations
throughout the country.148 Unlike the production of
cement blocks, which would be heavy and costly to
transport, ticket distribution firms appear to have
relatively low costs associated with distributing their
product throughout the country.
While some substitute firms operate only in one
region of the country, Ticketmaster and others ap-
pear to be after contracts with certain venues all
around the United States.144 Still, Ticketmaster,
Pearl Jam, the Union, and at least one news writer
appear to define the market nationally."' If the
commercial realities in the industry govern, the na-
tional market is the appropriate geographic market
here.46
142 SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 68.
143 See generally Boehlert, supra note 38 (tracking the use of
computer and telecommunications technology in the industry).
144 Id. (tracing the regional or scattered markets Tick-
etmaster rivals participate in).
146 See Hearing, supra note 6, at 128-34 (listing venues
where Ticketmaster says it does or does not have exclusive con-
tracts); Union Letter, supra note 95; Boehlert, supra note 38
(suggesting that Ticketmaster faces little national competition).
V. CONCLUSION
In its memorandum to the D.O.J., Pearl Jam ar-
gued that "because Ticketmaster is dominant in the
distribution of tickets to concerts, its rigid enforce-
ment of exclusive dealing agreements with virtually
every promoter and venue in the United States is a
blatant exercise of monopoly power in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. '1 47 To prove monopo-
lization in violation of Section 2, one must show that
the firm possesses monopoly power in a relevant
market and that it willfully holds that power. 148 As
this Comment demonstrates, Ticketmaster's relevant
market includes the distribution of tickets to rock
concerts at large venues, nationally. While the
D.O.J. ended or paused its investigation of Tick-
etmaster, this analysis can serve as a starting point
for a further evaluation of the ticketing industry.
49
146 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-
37 (1962)(suggesting that Congress intended a factual rather
than legalistic approach to defining the relevant market); see also
HOLMES, supra note 59, at 351-52.
17 See May Memorandum, supra note 5, at 7.
146 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966).
... Philips, supra note 8.
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